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Introduction	
Defendants	face	charges	for	their	respective	roles	in	owning	and	operating	an	online	classified	
advertisement	website.		Allegedly,	through	third	party	use	of	this	website,	women	and	young	girls	were	
sexually	exploited.		The	Attorney	General	seeks	to	hold	the	Defendants	criminally	liable	for	the	
victimization	of	these	women.		The	People	of	the	State	of	California	have	a	strong	and	legitimate	interest	
in	combating	human	trafficking	by	all	available	legal	means.		Moreover,	any	rational	mind	would	concur	
that	the	selling	of	minors	for	the	purpose	of	sex	is	particularly	horrifying	and	the	government	has	a	right	
and	a	duty	to	protect	these	most	vulnerable	victims.		
The	State’s	legitimate	interest	is	not	absolute,	however,	and	must	be	constrained	by	the	interests	
and	protections	of	the	First	Amendment	to	the	U.S.	Constitution.		In	that	vein,	the	United	States	Congress	
has	created	the	Communications	Decency	Act	under	47	USC	section	230	(“herein	CDA”).		The	CDA	
forecloses	suit	against	an	online	publisher	when	that	suit	is	based	on	speech	provided	by	a	third	party.		
(47	USC	§230	(c)	(1)	and	(e)	(3).)		By	enacting	the	CDA,	Congress	struck	a	balance	in	favor	of	free	speech	
by	providing	for	both	a	foreclosure	from	prosecution	and	an	affirmative	defense	at	trial	for	those	who	are	
deemed	an	internet	service	provider.	
In	fact,	this	Court	garners	strength	for	its	ruling	from	the	legislative	history	(or	lack	thereof).		The	
CDA	was	created	in	direct	response	to	a	legal	decision	holding	an	online	publisher	strictly	liable	for	
defamatory	statements	posted	by	third	parties.		(See	Stratton	Oakmont	v.	Prodigy	Servs.	Co.,	1995	N.Y.	
Misc.	LEXIS	229.)		Since	the	creation	of	the	CDA,	several	courts	have	construed	the	CDA’s	immunity	
provision	broadly,	such	that	close	cases	are	resolved	in	favor	of	immunity.		(Fair	Housing	Council	of	San	
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Fernando	Valley	v.	Roommates.com	LLC	(9th	Cir.	2008)	521	F.3d	1157,	1170‐1171.)		Congress	has	had	
ample	opportunity	to	statutorily	modify	the	immunity	provision	if	it	disagrees	with	prevailing	judicial	
application	of	this	provision.		Congress	has	not	done	so,	and	the	current	legal	framework	binds	this	Court.		
The	key	question	in	this	case	is	not	whether	speech	in	furtherance	with	human	trafficking	is	
protected	free	speech:	clearly	it	is	not.		The	issue	to	resolve	is	whether	the	Defendants	should	be	entitled	
to	immunity	under	the	CDA	for	providing	a	forum	for	third	party	speech,	or	whether	the	defendants	have	
crossed	the	line	of	merely	providing	a	forum	for	speech	to	become	actual	creators	of	speech,	and	thus	not	
entitled	to	immunity	under	the	CDA.	
	
Background	
Backpage.com	is	one	of	the	largest	on‐line	classified	advertisement	services,	through	which	users	
may	post	advertisements	in	a	variety	of	categories.		Posting	an	advertisement	in	the	“Adult	Services”	
category	requires	a	fee.		Through	various	levels	of	involvement	with	Backpage.com,	Defendants	find	
themselves	facing	criminal	charges	regarding	certain	advertisements	placed	in	the	“Adult	Services”	
category.		Carl	Ferrer,	Michael	Lacey	and	James	Larkin	currently	face	a	charge	of	conspiracy	to	pimp,	and	
Ferrer	faces	multiple	additional	charges	of	pimping	and	pimping	of	a	minor.			
	
The	allegations	are	that	Defendants	conspired	to	create	and	organize	a	website	that	allows	sex	
trafficking	to	take	place.		The	People	assert	that	Defendants	created	such	a	site,	knowing	that	prostitutes	
and/or	pimps	use	the	site	to	advertise	prostitution,	and	Defendants	did	so	with	the	intent	to	derive	
support	and	maintenance	from	the	prostitution	resulting	from	the	advertisements.			The	People	allege	
that	Defendants’	plan	has	come	to	fruition	and	that	they	have	derived	financial	support	and	maintenance	
from	the	prostitution	resulting	from	the	advertisements	third	parties	pay	Backpage.com	to	place.		
Allegedly,	Defendants	have	also	derived	support	from	prostitution	resulting	from	content	“created”	by	
Defendants	themselves	when	they	took	content	from	the	third	party	advertisements	originally	placed	on	
Backpage.com	and	posted	new	advertisements	on	EvilEmpire.com	and	BigCity.com	–	sites	also	created	
and	maintained	by	Defendant	Ferrer.						
	
On	October	19,	2016,	Defendants	filed	a	demurrer	to	the	felony	complaint	against	them.	Against	
the	backdrop	of	unsuccessful	attempts	by	the	California	and	other	state	Attorneys	General	to	shut	down	
adult	online	advertising,	the	Defendants	argue	that	the	instant	prosecution	cannot	go	forward.			
	
Defendants	claim	that	the	complaint	and	prosecution	are:	barred	by	the	First	Amendment,	legally	
deficient	under	Section	230	of	the	Communications	Decency	Act	(“CDA”),	and	devoid	of	any	facts	that	
constitute	public	offenses	under	the	criminal	statutes.				
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On	November	16,	2016,	this	Court	issued	a	tentative	ruling	on	the	matter,	but	allowed	additional	
briefing.		Both	parties	have	filed	additional	arguments	in	response	to	the	tentative	ruling.	
	
	
Court’s	legal	analysis	and	ruling	
	
	
1. Complaint	states	facts	that	constitute	public	offenses	
	
The	Defendants	argue	that	the	court	should	grant	the	demurrer	because	the	Complaint	fails	to	
allege	any	public	offense.		Rather,	Defendants	maintain,	the	People	are	pursuing	a	theory	of	prosecution	
based	on	allegations	that	third	parties	posted	content	allegedly	relating	to	unlawful	conduct.		Defendant	
Ferrer	also	claims	that	the	pimping	charges	against	him	are	deficient	because	there	is	nothing	to	connect	
Ferrer	to	any	of	the	advertisements	associated	with	the	nine	victims.		(Def.	24‐25)		All	the	defendants	
allege	that	the	complaint’s	conspiracy	charge	is	deficient	because	it	does	not	address	several	elements	of	
conspiracy.		(Def.	25‐26)	The	People	claim	that	the	complaint	expressly	alleges	that	Defendant	Ferrer	
“knowingly	and	repeatedly	took	the	earnings	of	victims	engaged	in	prostitution	because	his	livelihood	
depended	on	it.”		(Opp.	18)		As	to	the	conspiracy	between	all	the	defendants,	the	People	assert	that	the	
complaint	expressly	alleges	they	conspired	together	to	commit	pimping	for	the	purpose	of	further	
enriching	themselves.		(Opp.	19)		The	People	maintain	that	level	of	specificity	is	all	that	is	required	to	
provide	notice	under	Penal	Code	section	952.		(Opp.	18‐20)		The	People	argue	that	Defendants’	assertion	
that	the	complaint	does	not	adequately	state	facts	that	constitute	public	offenses	belies	confusion	
between	civil	and	criminal	pleading	requirements.		(Opp.	20)			As	stated	below,	the	key	issue	here	is	
whether	Defendants	are	able	to	claim	immunity	under	the	CDA.		Such	ability	to	claim	liability	would	not	
necessarily	render	the	complaint	deficient.		The	charging	instrument	however,	is	sufficient	in	this	case.			
	
2. Defendants	Challenge	is	Appropriately	Raised	in	a	Demurrer		
	
The	People	claim	that	a	demurrer	is	not	the	appropriate	vehicle	in	which	to	raise	a	defense	of	
immunity	under	the	CDA.		Rather,	the	People	contend	that	such	immunity	may	only	be	raised	as	an	
affirmative	defense.		This	Court	disagrees.			
	
A	demurrer	to	a	criminal	complaint	lies	only	to	challenge	the	sufficiency	of	the	pleading	and	raises	
only	issues	of	law.	(Pen.	Code,	§	1004;	People	v.	McConnell	(1890)	82	Cal.	620;	People	v.	Biane	(2013)	58	
Cal.4th	381,	388.)		A	defendant	may	demur	only	on	delineated	statutory	grounds.		(Pen.	Code,	§	1004;	
People	v.	Saffell	(1946)	74	Cal.App.2d	supp.	967,	972.)			These	include	the	ability	to	challenge	the	
accusatory	pleading	on	the	ground	that	the	pleading	includes	information	that	would	be	a	bar	to	
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prosecution.		(Pen.	Code,	§	1004(5).		See	also	People	v.	Goodman	(2014)	225	Cal.App.4th	950,	956.)		The	
language	of	the	CDA	itself	states,	“No	cause	of	action	may	be	brought	and	no	liability	will	may	be	imposed	
under	any	State	or	local	law	that	is	inconsistent	with	this	section.”		(47	U.S.C.	§230	(e)	(3)	(emphasis	
added).)		This	statutory	language	clearly	demonstrates	a	legislative	intent	to	provide	both	a	bar	to	
prosecution	and	an	affirmative	defense	at	trial	
Stated	more	succinctly	“...close	cases,	we	believe,	must	be	resolved	in	favor	of	immunity,	lest	we	
cut	the	heart	out	of	section	230	by	forcing	websites	to	face	death	by	ten	thousand	duck‐bites,	fighting	off	
claims	that	they	promoted	or	encouraged‐‐or	at	least	tacitly	assented	to‐‐the	illegality	of	third	parties.”		
Fair	Housing.	Council	v.	Roommates.com,	LLC,	521	F.3d	1157,	1174,	2008	U.S.	App.	LEXIS	7066,	*45,	36	
Media	L.	Rep.	1545	(9th	Cir.	Cal.	2008	(emphasis	added).	
	
	
3. The	First	Amendment	is	implicated	
	
Defendants	contend	that	the	First	Amendment	bars	prosecution,	as	the	People	are	seeking	to	
prosecute	individuals	for	the	act	of	publishing	third	party	content.		However,	the	instant	charges	are	not	
based	on	an	overt	attempt	to	criminalize	the	act	of	publication,	and	traditional	First	Amendment	analysis	
is	not	required	here.	That	is	not	to	say	that	the	First	Amendment	is	not	implicated.		As	noted,	the	
protections	afforded	by	the	First	Amendment	were	the	motivating	factors	behind	the	enactment	of	the	
CDA.	Congress	expressly	intended	to	relieve	online	publishers	from	liability	for	publishing	third‐party	
speech.		(47	U.S.C.	§	230)		Thus,	the	relevant	question	in	this	case	is	whether,	and	to	what	extent,	
Defendants’	activities	entitle	them	to	protection	of	their	First	Amendment	rights	through	the	immunity	
provision	of	the	CDA.			
	
a. Immunity	Under	the	Communications	Decency	Act	
The	CDA	provides	immunity	for	online	publishers	and	distributors	of	content	generated	by	third	
parties.		(Barrett	v.	Rosenthal	(2006)	40	Cal.4th	33,	39.)		Protection	from	the	CDA	is	broken	down	into	
three	parts.		Conduct	is	shielded	if	the	defendant	(1)	is	a	provider	or	user	of	an	interactive	computer	
service;	(2)	that	the	plaintiff	seeks	to	treat	as	a	publisher	or	speaker;	(3)	of	information	provided	by	
another	information	content	provider.		(Fields	v.	Twitter,	Inc.	(2016	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	105768,	*8;	Doe	v.	
Backpage.com	LLC	(2016)	817	F.3d	12,	19;	47	U.S.C.	§230.)		“There	has	been	near‐universal	agreement	
that	section	230	should	not	be	construed	grudgingly.”		(Doe,	supra,	817	F.3d	at	118	[citations	omitted].)			
	
The	second	component	is	the	instant	source	of	dispute.		Defendants	assert	that	Backpage.com	is	
an	internet	service	provider	that	merely	allows	third	parties	to	publish	their	content,	and	the	instant	
prosecution	seeks	to	impermissibly	treat	them	as	the	speaker.		The	People	respond	that	the	CDA	does	not	
protect	those	who	knowingly	commit	their	own	crimes	on	the	internet.		The	People	assert	that	
Defendants	should	be	viewed	as	content	providers,	and	not	entitled	to	immunity	under	the	CDA.	
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b. Content	provision	versus	editorial	functions	
To	determine	whether	defendant	faces	a	claim	that	seeks	to	treat	the	defendant	as	a	publisher	or	
speaker	of	information	provided	by	a	third	party,	“‘courts	must	ask	whether	the	duty	that	the	plaintiff	
alleges	the	defendant	violated	derives	from	the	defendant’s	status	or	conduct	as	a	publisher	or	speaker’.”		
(Fields,	supra,	2016	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	105768,	*10,	quoting	Barnes	v.	Yahoo!,	Inc.	570	F.3d	1096,	1101‐02.)		
Moreover,	because	distributors	are	included	in	the	publisher	category,	distributors	are	also	entitled	to	
protection	under	the	CDA.		After	all,	publication	includes	every	repetition	and	distribution	of	material.		
(Barrett	v.	Rosenthal	(2006)	40	Cal.4th	33,	45.)			Under	the	CDA,	“any	activity	that	can	be	boiled	down	to	
deciding	whether	to	exclude	material	that	third	parties	seek	to	post	online	is	perforce	immune.”		(Fair	
Housing	Council	of	San	Fernando	Valley	v.	Rommates.com,	LLC,	(9th	Cir.	2008)	521	F.3d	1157,	1170‐1171.)		
The	Ninth	Circuit	has	recognized	that	although	“there	will	always	be	close	cases	where	a	clever	lawyer	
could	argue	that	something	the	website	operator	did	encouraged	the	illegality…Such	close	cases	must	be	
resolved	in	favor	of	immunity…”	(Id	at	1174.)	
	
Although	the	People	acknowledge	that	third	parties	provided	the	content	for	the	original	
advertisements	placed	on	Backpage.com,	the	prosecution	asserts	that	Defendants	developed	the	content	
on	BigCity.com	and	EvilEmpire.com	by	deliberately	manipulating	that	original	content	to	generate	the	
advertisements	placed	on	BigCity	and	EvilEmpire.		The	People	assert	that	Defendants	created	“fake	
profiles”	when	“Backpage	staff	took	images	and	information	from	Backpage	escort	ads	and	used	them	to	
create	dating	profiles	on	BigCity.com.”	(Ex	1,	p2)			In	support	of	this	claim,	the	People	refer	to	an	internal	
Backpage	email	that	states	“The	content	will	be	pre‐populated	with	millions	of	images	from	backpage	
where	we	hope	to	extract	two	words	of	the	title,	the	phone	number,	and	age	of	the	person.		The	images	
will	need	to	be	processed	to	where	we	crop	an	area	most	likely	to	give	us	a	wholesome	image.”		(Ex	A)		
Backpage	also	added	new	information,	“in	line	with	the	alleged	purpose	of	the	profile.”		This	information	
was	not	taken	from	the	original	Backpage	ad,	and	required	staff	to	choose	one	of	the	following:	
“Interested	in	Men,”	“Interested	in	Women,”	or	“Interested	in	Everyone.”	(Ex	1,	p4)		There	were	no	links	
to	the	original	Backpage	ad	and	Defendants	hoped	to	pitch	BigCity	as	a	dating	site	to	Backpage.com	
escort	users.	
	
The	People	also	allege	that	“Defendants	took	images	and	information	from	Backpage	escort	ads	
and	used	them	to	create	a	phone	directory	for	female	escorts	on	EvilEmpire.com.”	(Ex	1,	p3)		Customers	
could	contact	the	escort	directly	from	the	number	listed	on	EvilEmpire	or	through	a	link	to	original	
Backpage	ad.		The	People	acknowledge	that	the	escort	phone	directory	used	“much	of	the	same	data	that	
was	selected	to	create	a	BigCity	profile	that	was	generated	for	that	Backage	escort	user.”		(Ex	1,	p5)			
However,	EvilEmpire	provides	no	opportunity	for	users	to	sign	up,	modify	or	contribute	to	entries.		(Ex	1,	
p5)	
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	 In	support	of	its	claim	that	these	actions	constituted	content	creation,	the	People	rely	on	People	v.	
Bollaert	(2016)	248	Cal.App.4th	699.		In	Bollaert,	the	defendant	was	convicted	of	extortion	and	unlawful	
use	of	personal	identifying	information.		He	set	up	two	websites:	a	revenge	porn	site	and	a	site	which	
victims	of	the	former	could	utilize	to	have	their	information	removed,	for	a	fee.		To	use	the	revenge	porn	
site,	defendant	designed	“required	fields”	that	required	a	user	seeking	to	post	a	photo	of	another	person	
to	input	that	other	person’s	full	name,	age,	location	and	Facebook	link.		Bollaert	had	the	only	user	
account;	he	looked	at	every	single	post	and	decided	what	would	get	posted,	placed	watermarks	on	each	
photographs	to	discourage	re‐posting	by	third	parties,	and	kept	a	spreadsheet	recording	every	post.		
Bollaert	would	not	post	pictures	that	he	considered	“garbage”	which	included	those	that	did	not	include	
nude	persons.		(Id	at	706)		At	trial,	the	jury	rejected	defendant’s	assertion	that	he	was	immunized	as	a	
service	provider	under	the	CDA.	
On	appeal,	the	Fourth	District	affirmed	the	conviction.		The	court	noted	that	the	immunity	under	
the	CDA	was	limited	to	interactive	computer	services	that	do	not	retain	or	acquire	personal	information	
with	the	intent	to	defraud,	or	that	do	not	act	as	content	providers.		(Id.	at	709‐710.)		In	Bollaert’s	case,	the	
evidence	showed	that	he	designed	the	revenge	porn	site	specifically	for	the	purpose	of	eliciting	nude	
photos	and	private	information	of	others.		Bollaert	then	used	that	personal	information	for	his	own	
purposes,	i.e.,	for	display	on	his	website,	to	gain	advertising	income	and	to	obtain	payments	from	his	
removal	website.		The	court	found	there	was	sufficient	evidence	that	Bollaert	retained	the	personal	
information	with	the	intent	to	defraud	the	victims.			
	
The	court	also	rejected	defendant’s	claim	that	he	was	entitled	to	immunity	under	the	CDA	because	
the	evidence	demonstrated	he	was	a	content	provider.		The	court	determined	that	Bollaert’s	affirmative	
acts	in	designing	the	website	to	require	users	to	provide	content	that	violated	other	persons’	privacy	did	
not	entitle	him	to	immunity	under	the	CDA.		The	court	based	its	conclusion	and	reasoning	on	the	Ninth	
Circuit’s	Roommates	decision,	which	also	involved	a	website	that	was	“designed	to	solicit”	content	that	
was	unlawful.		These	acts	were	not	neutral,	but	rather	“materially	contributed	to	the	illegality	of	the	
content”	such	that	the	defendant	became	a	content	provider.		(Bollaert,	supra,	248	Cal.App.	4th	at	721.)			
	
Defendants	here	contend	that	Bollaert	is	distinguishable	from	the	instant	case	because	in	that	
case,	the	defendant	Bollaert	required	the	entry	of	unlawful	information	by	the	user,	which	fell	into	the	
narrow	exception	to	immunity	recognized	by	Roommates.		(Def.	Supp.	3)	In	contrast,	Defendants	argue,	
Backpage.com	does	not	require	users	to	enter	unlawful	information.		This	Court	agrees	with	the	
Defendants.			
	
In	Fair	Housing	v.	Roommates.com	(9th	Cir.	2008)	521	F.3d	1157,	the	defendant	ran	a	website	for	
the	purposes	of	matching	potential	roommates	together.		In	order	to	utilize	the	website,	participants	
were	required	to	answer	a	series	of	questions	regarding	a	user’s	sex,	sexual	orientation	and	whether	they	
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will	bring	children	to	the	household.		Paid	subscriptions	provided	access	to	detailed	preferences	from	
potential	roommates.		(Id	at	1161‐1162)		The	Fair	Housing	Councils	of	two	cities	sued	Roommates,	and	
alleged	a	violation	of	the	Fair	Housing	Act	and	California	housing	discrimination	laws.		The	Councils	
alleged	that	the	website	was	acting	as	a	housing	broker	in	ways	that	it	could	not	lawfully	do	off‐line.		(Id	
at	162.)		The	district	court	granted	Roommate’s	motion	to	dismiss	based	on	immunity	provided	by	the	
CDA.		The	Ninth	Circuit	reversed.			
	
The	Ninth	Circuit	found	that	by	creating	the	questions	and	choice	of	answers	that	a	real	estate	
broker	was	legally	prohibited	from	asking	and	then	requiring	subscribers	to	answer	them,	Roommate	
became	an	information	content	provider	and	not	immune	under	the	CDA.		(Id	at	1164.)		The	court	
contrasted	Roommate’s	impermissible	behavior,	where	it	both	elicited	the	allegedly	illegal	content	and	
made	aggressive	use	of	it	in	conducting	its	business,	with	permissible	utilization	of	a	neutral	
classification	tool	or	search	engine	that	does	nothing	to	enhance	the	illegality	of	the	content.		(Id	at	1172.)			
	
Here,	there	are	no	allegations	that	Backpage	required	a	third‐party	user	to	provide	any	protected	
information	when	the	original	ad	is	placed.		As	the	information	posted	on	EvilEmpire	and	BigCity	is	
mostly	taken	from	the	original	ad,	Defendants	did	not	“design	to	solicit”	protected	content	as	a	condition	
to	placing	the	ad.		In	fact,	according	to	the	exhibits	attached	by	the	People,	Backpage	moderators	were	
instructed	to	look	for	offending	material	and	remove	it.		(AG	Supp.	6,	Ex	9)		
	
The	People	argue	that	Defendants	actively	“manipulated”	the	content	provided	by	third	parties	so	
that	they	could	profit	from	activity	resulting	from	the	ad	placement.		In	light	of	the	People’s	
acknowledgement	that	the	substance	of	the	ads	came	from	the	original	ad	placed	on	Backpage,	the	only	
“manipulation”	would	be	in	the	act	of	extracting	the	content	from	the	original	ad	and/or	from	the	act	of	
physically	posting	the	extracted	content	on	a	new	site.		This	is	not	prohibited	activity.		Indeed,	it	generally	
falls	within	the	scope	of	protected	editorial	functions.		(See	Doe	v.	Backpage.com	LLC	(1st	Cir.	2016)	817	
F.3d	12,	20‐21	[service	providers’	decisions	on	website	structure,	rules	for	posting	and	reposting	are	
protected	publisher	functions]	and	Fields	v.	Twitter,	Inc.	(N.D.	Cal	2016),	2016	U.S.	Dist.	Lexis	105768,	*21	
[protected	publishing	activity	included	decisions	about	what	third	party	content	may	be	posted	or	
reposted	online].)		(See	also	Jones	v.	Dirty	World	Entmt	Recordings	LLC	(6th	Cir.	2014)	755	F.3d	398‐408‐
409	[Sixth	Circuit	adopting	the	“material	contribution	test”	and	determining	that	within	the	context	of	
web	hosting,	a	service	provider	must	require	third‐parties	to	enter	unlawful	or	actionable	content	to	be	
deemed	a	content	provider].	
	
Undeterred,	the	People	assert	that	content	was	created	when	one	piece	of	information	was	added	
to	BigCity	profiles.		In	generating	a	BigCity	ad,	Backpage	staff	was	required	to	choose	“Interested	in	Men,”	
“Interested	in	Women,”	and	“Interested	in	Everyone.”		This	information	was	not	taken	from	the	original	
Backpage	ad.		Yet,	as	Defendants	note,	the	People	acknowledge	that	these	headings	were	“in	line”	with	
the	purpose	of	each	profile.	(Def.	Supp.	4,	fn3)		This	creation	of	a	headline	“in	line”	with	the	content	of	the	
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ad	was	not	a	material	contribution	to	the	offensive	nature	of	the	material.		(See	Phan	v.	Pham	(2010)	182	
Cal.App.4th	323	[holding	when	Defendant’s	own	acts	material	contribute	to	the	illegality	of	the	material,	
immunity	under	the	CDA	will	be	lost].	See	also	Kimzey	v.	Yelp!	Inc	(9th	Cir	2016)	836	F.3d	1263,	1270	
(Court	found	the	service	provider’s	creation	and	addition	of	a	star	rating	system	was	best	characterized	
as	the	kind	of	“neutral	tool”	operating	on	“voluntary	inputs”	determined	to	be	permissible	in	
Roommates.)	
	
The	People	also	accuse	Defendants	of	creating	“fake	profiles”	for	BigCity	postings,	similar	to	
Anthony	v.	Yahoo!	Inc	(N.D.	Cal.	2006)	421	F.Supp.2d	1257.		In	that	case,	Plaintiffs	belonged	to	an	online	
dating	service	through	Yahoo.		Plaintiffs	alleged	that	Yahoo	created	false	profiles	and	sent	those	false	and	
expired	profiles	to	them	as	enticement	to	renew	their	dating	service	subscription.		The	court	refused	
Yahoo’s	claim	of	immunity	under	the	CDA	at	the	dismissal	stage.		The	court	stated	that	the	allegations	
that	Yahoo	created	false	profiles	were	sufficient	to	allow	the	case	to	go	forward.	
	
Here,	the	People	have	acknowledged	that	the	content	posted	on	EvilEmpire	and	BigCity	were	
taken	directly	from	the	original	Backpage	ad.		This	is	different	than	the	allegation	in	Anthony	that	Yahoo	
created	a	profile	for	a	person	who	did	not	exist	and	represented	to	others	that	the	fictitious	person	in	the	
profile	was	available	to	date.			
	
The	People	maintain	Backpage	created	content	similar	to	in	J.S.	v.	Vill.	Voice	Media	Holdings,	LLC	
(2015)	184	Wn.2d	95J.S.		In	that	case,	advertisements	featuring	three	minor	girls	were	posted	online	on	a	
site	owned	by	Backpage.		These	girls	became	victims	of	sex	trafficking	and	brought	suit	against	Backpage.		
Backpage	moved	to	dismiss	the	case	on	the	basis	of	immunity	provided	by	the	CDA.		The	Washington	
Supreme	Court	refused	to	grant	the	motion	to	dismiss.		(Id	at	98‐99.)		The	J.S.	court	stated	that	the	case	
turned	on	whether	Backpage	merely	hosted	the	advertisements	or	helped	develop	the	content	of	those	
advertisements.		(Id	at	101)			
	
Applying	the	applicable	state	standard	for	a	motion	to	dismiss,	the	J.S.	court	found	that	the	
plaintiffs	alleged	facts	that,	if	proved	true,	would	show	that	Backpage	did	more	than	simply	maintain	
neutral	policies	prohibiting	or	limiting	certain	content.		Specifically,	those	allegations	included	that	
Backpage	intentionally	developed	its	website	to	require	information	that	allows	and	encourages	illegal	
trafficking	of	underage	girls,	developed	content	requirements	that	it	knows	will	allow	solicitors	to	evade	
law	enforcement	and	that	Backpage	knows	that	the	foregoing	content	requirements	are	a	fraud	and	ruse	
actually	aimed	at	helping	pimps	and	prostitutes.		(Id	at	102.)			The	J.S.	court	found	that	it	did	not	appear	
beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	no	facts	existed	that	would	justify	relief,	and	denied	Backpage’s	motion	
to	dismiss.		(Id	at	103.)		
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Here,	the	People	allege	that	Defendants	“created”	content	and	are	not	entitled	to	immunity.		
However,	on	the	face	of	the	allegations,	Defendants	have,	at	most,	republished	material	that	was	created	
by	a	third	party.		The	People	allege	that	the	content	was	taken	from	ads	placed	by	Backpage	Escort	users	
and	posted	onto	EvilEmpire.com.		The	declaration	in	support	of	Defendants’	arrest	warrant	states	that	
the	ads	placed	in	EvilEmpire.com	were	“essentially	identical”	to	the	ads	placed	by	the	third	party	on	
Backpage.com	and	that	EvilEmpire	was	an	“additional	platform	for	Backpage	Escort	ads.”		This	
demonstrates	republication,	not	content	creation.		Republication	is	entitled	to	immunity	under	the	CDA.		
(Barrett	v.	Rosenthal	(2006)	40	Cal.4th	33,	63.)		
	
Finally,	the	People	assert	that	the	Defendants’	acts	of	pulling	information	from	the	original	
Backpage	ad	“constituted	more	than	the	mere	reposting	of	information	with	‘slight’	modifications.”		(AG	
Supp.	5)		The	People	assert	that	when	posting	on	BigCity,	Backpage	staff	deleted	all	text,	and	converted	
the	ad	into	a	dating	profile,	contrary	to	the	intent	of	the	original	ad	poster.		Yet,	reposting	content	created	
by	a	third	party	is	immune	from	liability	for	the	offensive	content	under	the	CDA.		(Barrett	v.	Rosenthal	
(2006)	40	Cal.4th	33,	63.)			The	act	of	reformatting	original	content	to	be	placed	on	another	site	is	also	a	
traditionally	protected	editorial	function.		(See	Fair	Housing	Council	of	San	Fernando	Valley	v.	
Roommates.com	LLC	(9th	Cir.	2008)	521	F.3d	1157,	1170‐1171	[under	the	CDA,	“any	activity	that	can	be	
boiled	down	to	deciding	whether	to	exclude	material	that	third	parties	seek	to	post	online	is	perforce	
immune.”].)		Finally,	assuming	that	the	People’s	assertion	is	true;	that	the	ad	went	from	expressing	intent	
to	advertise	prostitution	to	express	a	desire	to	“date,”	the	People	are	essentially	complaining	that	
Backpage	staff	scrubbed1	the	original	ad,	removing	any	hint	of	illegality.	(AG	Supp.	5‐6)		If	this	was	the	
alleged	content	“manipulation,”	the	content	was	modified	from	being	illegal	to	legal.		Surely	the	AG	is	not	
seeking	to	hold	Defendants	liable	for	posting	a	legal	ad;	this	behavior	is	exactly	the	type	of	“good	
Samaritan”	behavior	that	the	CDA	encourages	through	the	grant	of	immunity.			
	
	 The	People’s	overall	theory	is	that	Backpage	knew	prostitution	ads	were	placed	on	its	main	site	
and,	in	response,	created	two	additional	websites	with	the	goal	of	encouraging	that	prostitution	through	
increased	ad	placement.		There	are	at	least	two	problems	with	this	theory.		First,	online	publishers	are	
not	subject	to	notice	liability.		(Barrett	v.	Rosenthal	(2006)	40	Cal.4th	33,	45‐46;	See	also	Jones	v.	Dirty	
World	Entmt	Recordings	LLC	(6th	Cir.	2014)	755	F.3d	398,	407‐408	[explaining	that	immunity	under	the	
CDA	bars	notice	liability	in	an	effort	to	maintain	the	robust	nature	of	the	internet	and	encourage	self‐
regulation].)				Next,	both	the	People’s	“encouragement	theory”	and	suggestion	that	by	reposting	the	ads,	
Defendants	are	ratifying	the	content	of	the	original	ad,	thereby	becoming	a	content	provider	themselves,	
have	been	rejected	by	the	courts.		(Jones	v.	Dirty	World	Entmt	Recordings	LLC	(6th	Cir.	2014)	755	F.3d	398,	
413‐414	[under	the	encouragement	or	ratification	theory,	service	providers	would	be	liable	for	inviting	
                                                          
1 The internal Backpage email attached by the AG states, “The content [of BigCity] will be pre-populated with millions of images 
from backpage where we hope to extract two words of the title, the phone number, and age of the person.  The images will need to be 
processed to where we crop an area most likely to give us a wholesome image.”  (Ex A)   
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and	commenting	on	illegal	or	actionable	content,	which	impermissibly	inflates	the	meaning	of	
“development”	to	the	point	of	eclipsing	immunity	from	publisher‐liability	established	by	Congress];	
Ascentive	LLC	v.	Opinion	Corp.	(EDNY	2011)	842	F.	Supp.2d	450,	476	[inviting	postings	then	altering	the	
way	postings	are	displayed	is	not	content	development];	Roommates,	supra,	521	F.3d	at	1174	
[encouragement,	enhancement	by	implication	or	development	by	inference	is	protected	conduct	under	
the	CDA];	Black	v.	Google	Inc	(N.D.	Cal	2010)	2010	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	82905,	*8	[even	if	defendants	
“sponsored	or	endorsed”	an	allegedly	defamatory	comment	posted	by	a	user,	“the	fact	remains	that	
Plaintiffs	seek	to	hold	it	liable	for	content	generated	by	a	third‐party”	and	defendants	are	entitled	to	
immunity	under	the	CDA].)				
	
This	Court	finds	Kimzey	v.	Yelp!	Inc	(9th	Cir	2016)	836	F.3d	1263	helpful.		Plaintiff	Kimzey	
complained	about	offensive	content	in	a	negative	business	review	posted	on	Yelp!	and	sought	to	hold	
Yelp!	liable.		Kimzey	alleged	that	Yelp!	Found	the	review	on	another	website,	reposted	the	offensive	
review	on	Yelp!	and	then	republished	the	review	as	an	advertisement	or	promotion	on	Google,	all	in	an	
effort	to	increase	online	traffic	to	Yelp!.		Kimzey’s	theory	was	that	by	repeatedly	reposting	the	“found”	
review	for	Yelp!’s	own	use,	Yelp!	developed	the	content.	(Id	at	1267)		The	Ninth	Circuit	rejected	Kimzey’s	
“artful	skirting	of	the	CDA’s	safe	harbor	provision.”		(Id	at	1266.)				
	
The	Ninth	Circuit	noted	that	Kimzey	never	specifically	alleged	that	Yelp!	authored	the	content	of	
the	statements	posted.		Instead,	the	allegations	were	that	Yelp!	adopted	the	statements	from	another	
website	and	transformed	them	into	its	own	stylized	promotions.		The	court	determined	that	the	
allegations	were	insufficient	to	avoid	immunity	under	the	CDA.		(Id	at	1268)		The	court	also	rejected	
Kimzey’s	“convoluted”	theory	that	Yelp!	transformed	the	review	into	its	own	advertisement	with	the	
creation	and	addition	of	a	star	rating	system	that	accompanied	the	promotion.		Although	this	
characterization	had	“superficial	appeal”	for	the	court,	the	court	found	that	accepting	the	theory	would	
extend	the	concept	of	“content	provider”	too	far	and	would	render	the	CDA’s	immunity	provision	
meaningless.		(Id	at	1269.)		The	court	stated	that	“Nothing	in	the	text	of	the	CDA	indicates	that	immunity	
turns	on	how	many	times	an	interactive	computer	service	publishes	‘information	provided	by	another	
information	content	provider.’”		(Ibid.)			
	
In	short,	courts	have	repeatedly	held	that	an	online	service	provider	is	protected	whether	he	
publishes	third‐party	content	for	the	first	time,	or	republishes	it	for	the	nth	time.		To	find	the	source	of	the	
liability	for	the	unlawful	or	actionable	content,	one	must	trace	the	pedigree	of	the	statement.		(Kimzey,	
supra,	836	F.3d	at	1268‐1269;	Jones,	supra,	755	F.3d	at	408‐409;	Doe	v.	Friendfinder	Network,	Inc,	540	
F.Supp.2d	288,	295‐296.)	
	
	
4. Removal	from	Protection	under	the	CDA	
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a. Victims’	Intellectual	Property	Rights	
The	People	assert	that	the	CDA	does	not	apply	because	Defendants	violated	the	victims’	rights	of	
publicity	when	Defendants	used	the	victims’	likenesses	posted	in	Backpage	ads	and	used	them	either	on	
BigCity	or	EvilEmpire	sites	without	the	victim’s	knowledge.		In	support,	the	People	cite	to	Doe	v.	
Backpage.com	LLC	(1st	Cir.	2016)	817	F.3d	12.		(AG	Supp.	9)		In	that	case,	plaintiffs	brought	claims	against	
Backpage	alleging	an	unauthorized	use	of	a	person’s	picture.		Plaintiffs	alleged	that	by	garnering	
advertising	revenues	from	advertisements	placed	by	their	traffickers,	Backpage	profited	from	the	
unauthorized	use	of	the	plaintiffs’	photographs.		The	plaintiffs	alleged	that	Backpage’s	use	of	their	images	
cannot	be	written	off	as	incidental	because	their	pictures	were	“the	centerpieces	of	commercial	
advertisements.”		(Id	at	27.)		The	court	found	that	although	Backpage	profited	from	the	sale	of	
advertisements,	“it	is	not	the	entity	that	benefits	from	the	misappropriation.”		Rather,	the	party	who	
benefits	from	the	misappropriation	is	the	person	who	placed	the	original	ad.		The	court	stated	“Matters	
might	be	different	if	Backpage	had	used	the	pictures	to	advertise	its	own	services…”		(Ibid.)					
The	People	assert	that	the	“matters	[that]	might	be	different”	are	present	here,	when	Defendants	
used	pictures	and	text	from	Backpage	ads	to	generate	new	ads	on	two	additional	websites.		In	response,	
Defendants	call	attention	to	the	fact	that	users	posting	on	Backpage.com	accept	the	website’s	Terms	of	
Use,	in	which	they	assign	all	intellectual	property	rights	and	agree	that	their	photos	and	content	may	be	
reposted.		(Def.	Supp.	10)			
	
The	right	of	publicity	derives	from	the	right	of	privacy.		Generally,	the	right	of	privacy	protects	an	
individual’s	peace	and	quiet.		The	right	of	publicity,	in	turn,	protects	an	economic	interest	a	person	has	in	
the	value	of	his	identity.		These	privacy	rights	are	personal.		(Hill	v.	National	Collegiate	Athletic	Assn	
(1994)	7	Cal.4th	1,	24.)		Thus,	the	prosecutor	does	not	have	standing	to	assert	this	right	on	behalf	of	the	
victims.		It	is	on	that	crucial	fact	that	sets	this	case	apart	from	Doe	v.	Friendfinder	Network	Inc	(2008)	540	
F.Supp.	2d	288,	304.	(See	AG	Supp.	9)		Friendfinder	involved	a	civil	plaintiff	seeking	damages	for	the	
violation	of	her	right	to	publicity	after	an	unknown	person	created	a	profile	on	her	behalf,	without	her	
knowledge	or	consent,	and	Friendfinder	used	portions	of	that	profile	as	advertisements	to	increase	the	
profitability	of	their	business.		The	court	found	the	allegations	sufficient	to	survive	a	motion	to	dismiss.	
(Ibid.)			
	
The	People	lack	standing	to	assert	this	right.		Moreover,	existing	case	law	indicates	that	these	
additional	advertisements	are	permissible	attempts	at	search	engine	optimization	in	an	effort	to	increase	
the	visibility	of	the	information	provided	by	the	third	party.		(See	Asia	Econ.	Inst.	V.	Xcentric	Ventures	LLC	
(C.D.	Cal.	2011)		2011	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	145380,	*19	[increasing	the	prominence	of	a	page	in	internet	
searches	do	not	amount	to	“creation	or	development	of	information”].)		Indeed,	the	very	purpose	behind	
the	third	party’s	placing	the	ad	on	Backpage	was	to	provide	accessibility	to	the	public	on	a	large	scale.		(Cf	
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Ibid	[the	purpose	of	consumer	reports	is	to	provide	accessibility	to	the	public	on	a	grand	scale	and	
“increasing	the	visibility	of	a	statement	is	not	tantamount	to	altering	its	message”].)				
	
b. Prosecution	for	pimping	under	Penal	Code	section	266H	
The	People	maintain	that	Defendants’	actions	were	not	neutral,	and	they	instead	took	an	active	
role	to	further	prostitution	and	seek	to	hold	Defendants	responsible	for	their	own	misconduct,	not	for	the	
speech	of	others.		“This	is	not	a	case	against	Backpage,	a	website;	it	is	a	case	against	three	individual	
defendants	who	used	multiple	platforms	to	commercially	sexually	exploit	vulnerable	women	and	
children.”	(AG,	Supp	2)			
	
This	Court	finds	it	difficult	to	see	any	illegal	behavior	outside	of	the	reliance	upon	the	content	of	
speech	created	by	others.		The	whiff	of	illegality	is	detected	only	when	considering	the	alleged	content	of	
the	statements	contained	in	the	ads.		Indeed,	the	theory	of	prosecution	requires	the	presumption	that	
illegal	content	was	contained	in	the	ads,	i.e.,	that	the	ads	were	explicitly	for	prostitution.		Under	the	
prosecution’s	theory,	Defendants	would	become	liable	at	the	point	where	information	provided	from	
third	parties	was	transferred	to	the	additional	two	websites	because,	according	to	the	People,	Defendants	
transferred	the	information	intentionally	to	help	to	facilitate	prostitution.		(When	prostitution	
transactions	took	place	as	a	result	of	the	ads,	more	ads	would	be	placed.)		Yet,	the	general	actions	
required	(absent	consideration	of	speech	content)	to	repost	the	ads	would	not	be	illegal.			Thus,	the	
prosecution	depends	on	consideration	of	speech	provided	by	a	third	party.	
			
i.	 Theory	that	Defendant’s	derived	financial	support	from	prostitution			
The	People	maintain	that	Defendants	may	be	prosecuted	under	the	theory	is	that	defendants	
derived	support	from	the	earnings	of	another’s	act	of	prostitution.	(See	McNulty,	supra,	202	Cal.App.3d	at	
630	[stating	the	two	theories	of	prosecution	for	pimping].)		The	People	assert	that	the	allegations	are	that	
the	Defendants	“knowingly	derived	support	from	prostitution	earnings,	i.e.,	profited	from	prostitution”	
when	they	created	EvilEmpire	to	improve	Backpage’s	search	results	(search	engine	optimization)	and	
created	BigCity	to	expand	Backpage’s	share	of	“online	commercial	sex	market”	and	profits.		The	People	
maintain	that	pimping	will	be	shown	when	the	People	demonstrate	that	Defendants	acquired	income	
from	prostitution	resulting	from	advertisements	placed	in	Backpage.com.		The	People	assert	that	
Defendants	agreed	upon	a	business	model	to	maximize	the	receipt	of	prostitution	earnings	and	
committed	many	overt	acts	in	furtherance	of	this	objective.		(Opp.	3)			
In	support,	the	People	cite	to	People	v.	Grant	(2011)	195	Cal.App.4th	107.		Grant	discusses	a	
distinction	between	financial	support	received	by	the	prostitute	(illegal)	and	funds	paid	by	the	prostitute	
for	services	rendered	or	other	purposes	(legal).			The	appellate	court	made	clear	that	“the	statutory	
prohibition	does	not	preclude	a	person	from	accepting	a	known	prostitute’s	funds	gained	from	the	
prostitute’s	lawful	activities	or	for	purposes	other	than	the	person’s	support	and	maintenance.”		(Id	at	
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116.		See	also	Allen	v.	Stratton	(C.D.Cal.	2006)	428	F.Supp.2d	1064,	1072,	fn	7	[a	natural	reading	of	the	
pimping	statute	does	not	apply	to	an	individual	who	provides	a	legitimate	professional	service	to	a	
prostitute	even	if	paid	with	proceeds	earned	from	prostitution,	the	service	provider	derives	support	from	
his	own	services];	People	v.	Reitzke	(1913)	21	Cal.App.740,	742	[a	legitimate	defense	to	pimping	is	that	a	
prostitute	loaned	the	defendant	money	for	the	purpose	of	going	into	the	saloon	business,	or	for	any	other	
purpose	except	the	purpose	of	being	supported	or	maintained	by	the	prostitute].)				
	
Here,	there	is	no	dispute	that	Backpage	charged	money	for	the	placement	of	advertisements.		Does	
this	qualify	as	services	rendered	for	legal	purposes?		Given	the	services	provided	by	the	online	publisher,	
the	answer	to	that	question	is	yes.		Providing	a	forum	for	online	publishing	is	a	recognized	legal	purpose	
that	is	generally	provided	immunity	under	the	CDA.		This	immunity	has	been	extended	by	the	courts	to	
apply	to	functions	traditionally	associated	with	publishing	decisions,	such	as	accepting	payment	for	
services	and	editing.		(See	e.g.,	Fields,	supra,	2016	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	105768,	*11‐12	[Twitter	immune	
against	claims	that	it	provided	ISIS	material	support	through	use	of	its	services	because	protected	
publishing	activity	included	decisions	about:	what	third	party	content	may	be	posted	online;	monitoring,	
screening,	and	deletion	of	content;	and	whether	to	prevent	posting].)		In	fact,	the	People	acknowledge	
that	the	mere	act	of	accepting	money	for	postings	is	permissible.		(Opp.	9)			The	case	law	is	clear	that,	as	
discussed	above,	immunity	is	removed	when	the	service	provider	affirmatively	acts	to	create	the	
offensive	content.			
	
This	Court	draws	support	for	its	conclusion	from	cases	in	other	jurisdictions.		In	Doe,	for	example,	
the	plaintiffs	alleged	that,	beginning	at	age	15,	they	were	trafficked	through	advertisements	on	
Backpage.com	and	Backpage	profited	from	their	victimization.		The	plaintiffs	filed	suit	against	
Backpage.com	for	violating	the	Trafficking	Victims	Protection	Reauthorization	Act	(“TVPRA”)	which	
prohibits	knowingly	benefitting	financially	from	sex	trafficking.		(Doe,	supra,	817	F.3d	at	15.)		Plaintiffs’	
theory	was	that	Backpage	engaged	in	a	course	of	conduct	designed	to	facilitate	sex	traffickers’	efforts	to	
advertise	their	victims	on	the	website	by	only	charging	for	posts	made	in	the	“Adult	Entertainment”	
section,	and	allowing	users	to	pay	an	additional	fee	for	“Sponsored	Ads,”	which	increased	the	number	of	
times	the	advertisement	appeared.		(Id.	at	17.)		Plaintiffs	also	alleged	that	Backpage	tailored	its	posting	
requirements	to	make	trafficking	easier	by	not	blocking	repeated	attempts	to	post	and	by	allowing	users	
to	pay	anonymously	through	prepaid	credit	cards	or	digital	currencies.		(Id	at	16.)				
	
Backpage	moved	to	dismiss	the	suit	under	Federal	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	12(b)	(6).		The	district	
court	granted	the	motion	and	found	that	the	CDA	provided	immunity	from	the	claims.		On	review,	the	
First	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	affirmed	the	district	court’s	ruling.	The	First	Circuit	rejected	the	plaintiffs’	
assertion	that	Backpage	participated	in	an	affirmative	course	of	conduct	and	actual	participation	in	sex	
trafficking.		The	court	noted	that	the	challenged	were	traditional	publisher	functions,	and	thus	immune	
from	suit	under	the	CDA.		(Id.	at	20)		The	court	also	noted	that	the	plaintiffs	were	harmed	when	they	
were	trafficked	through	the	advertisements.		Without	the	content	of	those	advertisements	–	which	was	
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created	by	a	third	party	‐	there	would	be	no	harm.		(Id.	at	20.)		The	court	dismissed	the	plaintiffs’	
assertion	that	Backpage’s	decisions	about	what	measures	to	implement	demonstrate	a	deliberate	
attempt	to	make	sex	trafficking	easier.		The	court	stated,	“Whatever	Backpage’s	motivations,	those	
motivations	do	not	alter	the	fact	that	the	complaint	premises	liability	on	the	decisions	that	Backpage	is	
making	as	a	publisher	with	respect	to	third‐party	content.”		(Id	at	21.)			The	court	went	on	to	state	“even	if	
we	assume,	for	argument’s	sake,	that	Backpage’s	conduct	amounts	to	‘participation	in	a	[sex	trafficking]	
venture’	–	a	phrase	that	no	published	opinion	has	yet	interpreted	–	the	TVPRA	claims	as	pleaded	premise	
that	participation	on	Backpage’s	actions	as	a	publisher	or	speaker	of	third‐party	content.		The	strictures	
of	section	230(c)	foreclose	such	suits.”		(Ibid.)		The	First	Circuit	specifically	held	that	“claims	that	a	
website	facilitates	illegal	conduct	through	its	posting	rules	necessarily	treat	the	website	as	a	publisher	or	
speaker	of	content	provided	by	third	parties	and,	thus,	are	precluded	by	section	230(c)(1).”		(Id.	at	22.)		
	
Similarly,	in	M.A.	ex	rel.	P.D.	v.	Village	Voice	Media	Holdings,	LLC	(E.D.	Mo.	2011)	809	F.Supp.2d	
1041,	the	plaintiff	sought	to	hold	Backpage	responsible	for	her	victimization	through	sex	trafficking	that	
took	place	as	a	result	of	advertisements	placed	on	Backpage.com.		The	plaintiff	alleged	that	Backpage	
accepted	a	fee	for	such	advertisements,	knew	that	advertisements	were	for	prostitution	and	“created	
information”	by	hosting	a	search	engine,	providing	instructions	for	increased	visibility	of	advertisements	
and	allowed	for	anonymous	payment.		(M.A.,	supra,	809	F.Supp.2d	at	1044.)		The	court	granted	the	
Defendant’s	motion	to	dismiss	on	the	basis	that	the	CDA	provided	immunity.		The	court	reasoned	that	
there	was	no	allegation	that	Backpage	was	responsible	for	the	actual	development	of	any	portion	of	the	
content	of	the	advertisements	or	specifically	encouraged	the	development	of	the	offensive	nature.		(Id	at	
1052.)		(See	also	Opp.	21;	Def.	21‐22)			
	
Even	in	viewing	the	offer	of	proof	of	the	evidence	most	favorable	to	the	Attorney	Generals	office,	
this	case	is	very	similar	to	the	above	cases.		As	alleged	here,	the	prostitution	took	place	as	a	result	of	an	
advertisement	placed	by	a	third	party.		Backpage’s	decision	to	charge	money	to	allow	a	third	party	to	
post	content,	as	well	as	any	decisions	regarding	posting	rules,	search	engines	and	information	on	how	a	
user	can	increase	ad	visibility	are	all	traditional	publishing	decisions	and	are	generally	immunized	under	
the	CDA.	In	short,	the	victimization	resulted	from	the	third	party’s	placement	of	the	ad,	not	because	
Backpage	profiting	from	the	ad	placement.			
	
Conclusion	
	 	
The	First	Amendment	“makes	the	individual,	not	government,	the	keeper	of	his	tastes,	beliefs,	and	
ideas.”		Paris	Adult	Theater	I	v.	Slaton	(1973)	413	US	49,	73	(Douglas,	J.,	dissenting).	At	the	same	time,	the	
Court	understands	the	importance	and	urgency	in	waging	war	against	sexual	exploitation.		Regardless	of	
the	grave	potential	for	harm	that	may	result	in	the	exercise	of	this	article	of	faith,	Congress	has	precluded	
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liability	for	online	publishers	for	the	action	of	publishing	third	party	speech	and	thus	provided	for	both	a	
foreclosure	from	prosecution	and	an	affirmative	defense	at	trial.	Congress	has	spoken	on	this	matter	
and	it	is	for	Congress,	not	this	Court,	to	revisit.	
	
Court’s	ruling:	
Defendants’	demurrer	is	GRANTED.	
Defendants’	request	for	judicial	notice	is	DENIED.				
Further	court	dates	are	vacated.	
Bond	is	exonerated	for	each	Defendant.	
	
	
Dated:		December	9,	2016	
____________________________________	
Honorable	Michael	G.	Bowman	
Judge	of	the	Superior	Court	of	California		
County	of	Sacramento	
